In an article headlined "Report Finds Naval Blockade by Israel Legal but Faults Raid" the New York Times reported yesterday on the release of the UN Secretary General's Panel of Inquiry into the events surrounding the Israeli attack on the flotilla on May 31, 2010. It also leaked a copy of the report.

The report has been sensationalized for some time -- it has been delayed in its release, having been completed in July 2011 -- due to the effect it would have on relations between Israel and Turkey. In fact, today Turkey expelled Israel's representative and "decided to downgrade its diplomatic ties with Israel to the lowest possible level" as a response to the report.
Due to the impact of the Goldstone Report on Israel's Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, it is only natural that this report will be seen through the prism of the Goldstone experience and in comparison to it. But in reality, this Palmer Report (named for the leader of the inquiry Sir Geoffery Palmer) and the Goldstone Report are two very different things.
The Goldstone report was the outcome of a fact-finding mission initiated by the UN Human Rights Council which was mandated to investigate violations of international law and human rights during the 23-day Israeli campaign in Gaza. The Palmer report was NOT the outcome of a fact-finding mission, nor was it initiated by the UN Human Rights Council. A report like that on the flotilla had already been initiated and completed a year ago, and can be found in its entirety here.
It is important to note the differences between the two reports, not only because of their starkly contrasting conclusions about the events on the flotilla and the Israeli blockade, but also because of their methodologies and intentions. Below, I enumerate some important differences between the newly released Palmer Report and what I will refer to as the Hudson-Phillips report for consistency and expediency.
1. Origins- The Hudson-Phillips report originated from a June 2nd (two days after the flotilla attack) resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) which called for an "independent international fact-finding mission." The Palmer report did not originate from the UNHRC and instead was initiated by the UN Secretary General on August 2nd (two months after the flotilla attack). While the Hudson-Phillips report was tasked with:"investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding the boarding by Israeli military personnel of a flotilla of ships bound for Gaza and to determine whether in the process violations occurred of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law"The Palmer panel, which the UN Secretary General called an "unprecedented development" was aimed at what the Secratery General hoped would effect "positively on the relationship between Turkey and Israel"2. Composition- The UNHRC appointed to the fact-finding mission:Judge Karl T. Hudson-Phillips, Q.C., retired Judge of the International Criminal Court and former Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, to be chairman and to head the mission. The other appointed members were Sir Desmond de Silva, Q.C. of the United Kingdom, former Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone and Ms. Mary Shanthi Dairiam of Malaysia, founding member of the Board of Directors of the International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific and former member of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.As for the Palmer report, the panel of inquiry was composed of Sir Geoffery Palmer, former Prime Minister of New Zealand as chair and the former President of Columbia, Alvaro Uribe as vice-chair. The inquiry also included a representative from Turkey and a representative of Israel. The appointment of politicians instead of jurists to the Palmer inquiry suggests strongly that political and diplomatic considerations were more important than fact-finding or law.3. Methodology: The Hudson-Phillips report is explicit about its methodology in paragraphs 18-25. It directly collected and evaluated evidence and in the process interviewed 112 witnesses. In contrast, the Palmer report interviewed ZERO witnesses and instead relied on the reports of Israel and Turkey. The Palmer report states clearly that:The Panel enjoyed no coercive powers to compel witnesses to provide evidence. It could not conduct criminal investigations. The Panel was required to obtain its information from the two nations primarily involved in its inquiry, Turkey and Israel, and other affected States. The position is thoroughly understandable in the context of the Panel’s inquiry but the limitation is important. It means that the Panel cannot make definitive findings either of fact or law. But it can give its view.And while the Palmer panel did get to view witness reports appended to the Turkish investigation, when discrepancies arose about accounts between the Turkish report and the Israeli report, the panel had no ability to independently substantiate witness statements or corroborate evidence. In cases where the Turkish and Israeli reports disagreed, Palmer and Uribe would just have to make a decision based on the reports from the two countries and not independently ascertained facts.While the Palmer panel received direct input from both representatives of the states of Israel and Turkey, which allowed both states to promote their individual national interests, it featured no mechanism for direct input from the members of civil society which undertook the flotilla effort and were the direct victims of the Israeli attack. For its part, the Hudson-Phillips report made extensive efforts to garner information, but the state of Israel refused to cooperate with it.4. Conclusions- Perhaps the most important difference between the two reports is their conclusions. The Palmer report largely vindicates Israel, calling its blockade legal, but criticizes the way in which the raid on the flotilla was carried out. The Hudson-Phillips report condemns the use of force against civilians on the flotilla, but is also very clear on the illegality of the blockage saying "any action in response which constitutes collective punishment of the civilian population in Gaza is not lawful in any circumstances."
Both reports should be read in their entirity to properly appreciate the differences between them.
So what happened here? How can two reports on the same events issued by the UN differ so drastically?
It seems what happened here is that Israel learned a very difficult lesson from the Goldstone Report: that it must ignore and marginalize any inquiries into violations it committed unless it can ensure a positive outcome for its reputation. This is not to say that Israel cooperated with the Goldstone inquiry, because it did not. And it seems Israel realized that the strategy of simply ignoring the inquiries and not cooperating will not guarantee that it won't suffer significant international condemnation as the result of a damning report that will be published with our without Israeli cooperation.
Instead, the best way for Israel to mitigate such condemnation was to cooperate with an inquiry, but only one in which they had a reason to expect a positive outcome. The illusion of impartiality created by the Palmer inquiry, because it included Israeli and Turkish representatives, is no substitute for a genuine fact-finding commission -- especially not for the families of the 9 dead civilians and the 1.5 million more civilians suffering from the Israeli siege -- but for Israel it accomplished the task at hand. Clearly, Israel participated in the Palmer inquiry with the same sort of confidence John Gotti had walking into court; evidence and justice didn't really matter and it knew the outcome would be a desirable one.
The Palmer report was never intended to ascertain what happened on the flotilla, why it happened and who is at fault. Rather, it accepted that both Israel and Turkey had a narrative of these events, and its job was to marry those narratives into something acceptable enough to both sides to get Israel out of the flotilla mess unscathed, and improve relations between the two nations.
Turkey is clearly incensed over this report. With 9 of its citizens dead and others badly injured in an act of civil disobedience against what Turkey and much of the international community considers an illegal blockade, it is unlikely Ankara will remain quiet about this. Still despite this, Israel could have apologized for the killings -- "most of the deceased were shot multiple times, including in the back, or at close range" -- but decided not to because it seems even an apology would be too incriminating for an state that has become paranoid about its perception internationally.
But Ankara seems to understand Israel's vulnerability to international isolation, and now, without Israel issuing an apology that could have mitigated a breakdown in ties, Turkey seems hell-bent on hitting Israel where it hurts: in the court of international opinion. The Turkish ambassador to the United States tweeted earlier today: "Israel should understand that no country is above the international law and that the Mediterranean is not a lake of its own." Its foriegn minister also declared that Turkey will initiate proceedings in international legal arenas on the legality of the Israeli blockade.
Israel's stubbornness at this stage reminds me of its stubbornness prior to the 1973 war when it ignored diplomatic efforts to secure minor withdrawals from Sinai that might have avoided the entire confrontation.
Here again, after a foray into the Palmer report with the purpose of mitigating further international marginalization, Israel only finds itself having angered Turkey more. In a revolutionary region where Israel is loosing what few autocratic friends it had rapidly, it once again finds itself barreling toward further isolation.
I can't say I'm surprised; that will continue to be the case as long as Israel's occupation and it's siege of the Gaza Strip continues.


It seems like we were right. The troubling part is that, when you study settler violence over time you realize that the most dramatic spike that comes on an annual basis is during the olive harvest season -- at the end of October. With a 57% increase in violence by July, the number of violent incidents against Palestinian civilians may well double last year's numbers. 
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