Top 10 Facts You Probably Didn’t Know About the #Nakba

1.       Nakba is the Arabic word for catastrophe. It is used to describe the Palestinian loss of land and property during the depopulation of Palestine from 1947-1949 and does not refer simply to the declaration of a state of Israel.

Residents of Yaffa Pushed Into The Sea Prior to May15th, 1948

2.       212 localities depopulated and at least half of the refugees created during the Nakba were created prior to May 15^th, which is, prior to the entry of armies of other Arab states. The largest Palestinian cities at the time, Yaffa and Haifa, were emptied of the vast majority of their inhabitants before May 15^th, 1948. The idea that refugee creation happened only after, or only as a result of, the mobilization of Arab armies is patently false.

3.       At every stage of the war, the Yishuv/Israeli forces were superior in training, equipment and numbers to the combined Arab armies.

All That Remains of a Village Near Beisan

4.       The Zionists prepared extensive data collection efforts to map out intelligence relating to the Palestinian villages for a decade prior to the war. Detailed information about each village was kept including information on the number of inhabitants, the village’s resources, the potential activists that resided within it and what its political affiliations were.

5.       Of the over 500 Palestinian villages depopulated during the Nakba, 303 were depopulated as a result of either direct expulsion  carried out by Yishuv/Israeli forces or as a result of attack by Yishuv/Israel forces.

6.       Of the depopulated villages, 81 have been completely obliterated which means there is no traceable sign of their existence. Rubble was identified at the site of another 140 villages. Some standing walls were apparent at another 60 villages while 74 more had few houses intact. Other villages had houses intact and occupied by Israelis.

7.       Golda Meir struck a secret agreement with the King of Jordan before the war. Even though Jordan’s Arab Legion was the most formidable of the Arab armies, and even though the massacre at Deir Yassin tested this agreement, the Jordanian forces didn’t cross into territory that was designated for the Jewish State under the UN partition plan.

Palestinians Expelled During Operation Dani Recalled by Rabin

8.       After the depopulation of towns and villages, rampant looting of personal property took place. Israeli civilians and soldiers took part in stealing from vacated Palestinian homes and shops. Israeli historian Tom Segev notes that 1,800 trucks were taken from the town of Lydda alone.

9.       While 700-800,000 Palestinians were made refugees and not permitted to return by the state of Israel, 150,000 did remain inside Israel and many became internally displaced persons who still lost their property and were subjected to martial law until 1966 and various discriminatory laws since then.

10.   Yitzhak Rabin, an officer during the 1948 war, included a description of orders to forcibly expel tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians in his memoirs. The State of Israel prevented this description from being printed when his memoirs were published and, as far as I am aware, continues to prevent it today.*


*UPDATE: The censored passage from Rabin's memoirs was published in the appendix of a 1996 English version published after Rabin's death. It is unclear if the passage is permitted for inclusion within the text of the memoirs themselves or in versions published in Hebrew or in Israel. 

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Netanyahu and other Yahoos: Short and Long Term Objectives Served

Late last night the news emerged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition came to an agreement with Shaul Mofaz, the recently-elected head of the Kadima party to form a unity government. The deal, which would put Netanyahu atop a coalition that controls more than 3/4 of the Israeli parliament, took many by surprise.

It shouldn't shock anyone however. The deal is in the mutual interests of Netanyahu and Mofaz and smaller parties within the coalition like Yisrael Beiteinu and Shas had little sway in the matter.

For Netanyahu, an agreement with Mofaz's 29-seat Kadima party which stipulates that Kadima will follow Likud policies through the election in 2013 is a de facto expansion of the Likud Party. While Netanyahu's Likud was likely to win the largest number of seats if an election was held this fall, he would still have to piece together a coalition of right-wing parties similar to the current coalition. This was not only possible but probable, however it would not be the safest outcome for Netanyahu. Given divisive issues that could break the coalition apart, like the question of outposts, and given the legal troubles of Avigdor Lieberman who heads Yisrael Beiteinu, governing after fall elections was easily imaginable but so were the internal challanges that might come with it.

Mofaz, on the other hand, was heading a party that could count the moments until its own irrelevance became undeniable. Even though Kadima was the largest party in the Knesset, they are unable to bring together a coalition. Polls indicated that languishing in opposition did not serve the party well and if elections where held in the fall Kadima's 29 seats would be cut in half - at least.

This moment in Israeli politics essentially signals the end of the experiment called Kadima. Born out of Likud, Kadima was unable to differentiate itself from its ideological origins enough to justify its existence as a separate party. It seems likely that Kadima will simply dissolve in the future with the more right-wing members reintegrating into Likud and their opponents defecting leftwards.

Until then, however, Kadima had 29 seats which public opinion polls indicated lost half their value. In short, Kadima is like an overpriced house that was bought before the bubble burst whose owners suddenly realized they were significantly underwater. Netanyahu swooped in with the liquidity that comes with premiership and  leased the over-priced home to the Israeli voter who will pay top-shekel to cover the mortgage through 2013 while Mofaz and company enjoy the extra square footage.

The effects of this are essentially two-fold: Netanyahu benefits from additional political stability and maneuverability during an upcoming year filled with unknown variables like coalition disputes, Lieberman's legal issues and the outcome of the US election and at the same time sets the stage for the further decay of the Israeli 'left'.

Remember, when Kadima defected from Likud, Likud shrunk but quickly gained back seats in the next election even as Kadima remained strong. Now, as the carcass of Kadima will be divided up, Likud will only continue to grow and its dominance in Israeli politics is likely to continue well past the inevitable 2013 election. Until then, parties in opposition like the nearly irrelevant Labor party of Yachimovich and practically unknown party of Yair Lapid will continue to be irrelevant and unknown.

Netanyahu has managed to use his leverage over a vulnerable Mofaz to ensure Likud is the only game in town in 2012, 2013 and beyond. His move toward an election, or at least the appearance of that, clarified Kadima's options and put pressure on the party to make a deal just days after Mofaz attacked Netanyahu calling him a liar.

In fact, here is Mofaz quoted just one month before last night's deal: "I intend to replace Netanyahu...I will not join his government."

So, much can change in a month, at least in some areas. For the Palestinian question, however, this changes nothing.

Kadima and Likud are not very different. Even during what some consider the 'good ole days' of Ehud Olmert and Kadima, settlement expansion was on going. In fact, the deepest settlement expansion activity in recent history was a Kadima initiative.

If any good comes out of this deal between Mofaz and Netanyahu it could only be that it forces those seriously thinking about a way forward to finally forgo, entirely, the idea that there is a viable, anti-colonialist political alternative to Likud in Israeli politics or will be one any time soon. There isn't. 

Thus, we shouldn't be waiting for it and we should operate under the assumption that it isn't going to happen.

If Obama was the best shot the Palestinians had, and will have, and Netanyahu has guaranteed right-wing dominance of Israeli politics well into an Obama second term, the move toward this new coalition is only further proof that the entire US-led negotiations framework is a pitiful waste of time.

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What 60 Minutes & Bob Simon Got Right and Wrong

If you haven't seen it, yesterday's installment of CBS's long-running news program "60 Minutes" included a very important segment where journalist Bob Simon investigates what is behind the dwindling presence of Palestine's Christian population. The segment was powerful and overall very positive. Here is what Bob Simon got right and what he got wrong:

What he got right: The question of the status of the Palestinian Christian population in Palestine is not a new one. In fact, the broader question of 'Christian Flight' has long been around, particularly in western discourse. Often, however, investigations into this question in the past have looked superficially at population numbers and come to conclusions without any rigorous inquiry.

What Bob Simon got so right was his approach to the story. To find out what was bothering Palestinian Christians, Bob Simon thought it might be a good idea to talk to them, their representatives and the leaders of their institutions. This shouldn't be revolutionary, but when it comes to the question of Christians in Palestine in the mainstream US media, allowing Palestinian Christians to actually speak for themselves is sadly novel.

Perhaps this is why the segment managed to draw ire from the Michael Oren, the Ambassador of Israel, even before he saw it. Bob Simon asked Oren how he could draw conclusions about a report he has yet to see. Oren stumbled to respond to a rather straightforward question, first half-saying he assumed it would be bad for Israel then saying he had 'information'.

Unless Oren and the state of Israel has a network of spies at CBS the only information he must have had is who Bob Simon spoke to: Palestinian Christians. I'm sure Oren was also able to figure out no official representatives of the State of Israel were interviewed either. So, what set off alarm for Oren was that Palestinian Christians where actually going to have an opportunity to narrate their own story to a national American audience.

That is all the 'information' Oren needed to freak out and Bob Simon, recognizing how ridiculous this was, gave Oren the opportunity to expose himself to an national American audience. Bob Simon did not intend his piece to be a comment on the way Israel attempts to control the discourse on Palestine and Palestinian Christians, but Michael Oren made that especially news worthy.

The Anastas house, (pictured right) which is surrounded by Israel's apartheid wall on three sides and was featured in the CBS segment, is very much symbolic of the larger issue Oren helped Simon expose. Michael Oren and others want to wall-off the discourse so only one angle, one direction, one perspective- the official Israeli perspective- is visible. Bob Simon's segment busted through some of these walls by simply going to the source of the subject matter; Palestinian Christians.

Simon's segment made clear that Israel isn't targeting Palestinian Christians as Christians, rather they are targeted by Israeli policies because they are Palestinians. Israel is an Equal Opportunity Occupier and its walls, checkpoints and restrictions do not discriminate between Christians and Muslims. There is no doubt, however, that Palestinian populations in cities like Bethlehem and Jerusalem, which have historically been home to a significant number of Christians, face some of the most severe effects of Israeli policies.

By giving voice to Palestinian Christians and by showing how this community in Palestine was particularly vulnerable to Israeli occupation, Simon struck a devastating blow at a pillar of Israeli propaganda which became most prominent after 9/11; that Israel is at the front lines in a common Judeo-Christian battle against Islamism.

The Israel Lobby's alliance with American Christians, particularly evangelicals, is an integral part of its successful efforts to influence American policy makers. How Israeli policies effect Palestinian Christians might change this and there were stirrings of concern in the Jewish community about a change in this relationship prior to Simon's 60 minutes segment. Thus, the preemptive strike against CBS was entirely predictable.

Oren seemed to be at a loss for words at some points and when Simon, a veteran journalist, told him he had never in his years of reporting received complaints on a story before it aired Oren replied "Well, there is a first time for everything, Bob."

Oren's right, there is a first time for everything. This is the first time that an Israeli Ambassador's intimidation tactics were so bravely turned against him by a journalist who just wasn't going to take it any more. Hopefully it is a harbinger of things to come.

The Israeli Ambassador is right to complain of a 'hatchet job' but he was the one who brought the hatchet then proceeded to turn it on himself. Simon just kept the cameras rolling.

What he got wrong: Bob Simon made one glaring factual error which was dissapointing. Almost in passing, as he narrates over imagery of Israel's wall in the West Bank, Simon says that: "Israel built the wall over the last 10 years, which completely separates Israel from the occupied West Bank." But, of course, this is far from true. In fact, the wall cuts deeply into the West Bank and is not built on the green line, the West Bank's perimeter. What makes this error more disappointing is that in a 60 Minutes segement that Mr. Simon did in 2009 (also very much worth watching) he described the wall's path far more accurately:

"Israel is building what it calls a security wall between the West Bank and Israel to stop suicide bombers. The Palestinians are furious because it appropriates eight percent of the West Bank. Not only that. It weaves its way through Palestinian farms, separating farmers from their land. They have to wait at gates for soldiers to let them in."

Overall, this story was a very important expose of Israel's treatment of Palestinians and also how Israel attempts to regulate mainstream American discourse on the issue. For this, we have to thank Bob Simon and the folks at 60 Minutes, and of course, Ambassador Michael Oren.

For how much longer will Israel's oppression of the native Palestinians last? For how much longer will the US mainstream media hesitate to tackle this issue and give voice to Palestinians?

The clock is ticking and thanks to this 60 Minutes segment last night it is ticking a little faster this morning.

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Did #Israel Provoke #Gaza Escalation to Test 'Iron Dome'?

When the Israeli military extra-judicially assassinated the Popular Resistance Committee leader Zuhair Qaisi they provoked a barrage of rockets. I knew this would happen. They also knew very well that this would happen. Anyone looking at the numbers and the dynamics of violence in and out of Gaza would know this would happen. The Israelis claim that Qaisi was planning an attack through Sinai. Of course, they provide no evidence of this. We are just supposed to take them at their word. Reports also indicate that the Israelis were monitoring Qaisi's every move for some time.

Qaisi's predecessor was killed by an Israeli assassination last August in an Israeli strike which left 6 dead, including a 3 year old child. The Israelis claimed an attack that came from Sinai on Eilat had originated in Gaza. This seemed suspicious at the time. The Eilat attack was well coordinated and beyond what anyone estimated to be the operational capabilities of a small faction like the PRC. Sure enough, we later learned the IDF acknowledged that Egyptian Beduin perpetrated the attack. It was easier and less politically costly for the Israelis to retaliate against Gaza since nobody seems to ask questions when Israelis kill Palestinians in Gaza - its become routine. Had they struck at Egypt however, they would have to calculate the unknown variable of a revolutionary Egypt's reaction. Gaza was the more convenient place to go for revenge. Israeli journalist Amira Hass noted at the time how no signs in Gaza pointed to local responsibility for the attacks.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that Qaisi was planning an attack, the timing of the Israeli assassination was still elected and not forced since, as the Israelis admit, Qaisi was not an imminent threat.

This begs the question; Why would the Israeli government take an action which they know would immediately provoke a response putting more Israelis at risk than if they would not have. The Israelis claim to have had detailed intelligence to justify the assassination of Qaisi so wouldn't it make more sense to use that information to defend Israeli interests without provoking a response that would bring a barrage of projectile file? Of course it would, but that is not the course of action the Israelis chose.

It seems as though they wanted to provoke a response. But why? Why would the Israeli government put Israelis at risk when this was entirely avoidably? (Of course, they ultimately put Palestinians at risk the most but the Israeli government has never been all too concerned about that anyway)

It may be because something happened on the way to AIPAC. While Netanyahu and his Israel Lobby friends have done a very good job of convincing members of Congress to support an Israeli strike on Iran, there is one audience that is significantly less convinced and less gung-ho; Israelis.

From a poll that was released immediately before the AIPAC conference (obviously intentional timing) we learned that the Israeli public and their Prime Minister are not on the same page. Shibley Telhami writes about the poll conducted with the Israeli Dahaf Institute at the end of February 2012:

Only 19 percent of Israelis polled expressed support for an attack without U.S. backing, according to a poll I conducted — fielded by Israel’s Dahaf Institute Feb. 22-26 — while 42 percent endorsed a strike only if there is at least U.S. support, and 32 percent opposed an attack regardless.

This does not appear to be because of Israeli worries about potential American punishment. In fact, Israelis remain confident the U.S. would support them, at least diplomatically (38 percent), or join the war on Israel’s behalf (27 percent) — even if Israel struck Iran without Washington’s approval. Only 15 percent expect reduced American support. What seems behind these attitudes is an assessment of the consequences of an Israeli attack.

A majority of Israelis polled, roughly 51 percent, said the war would last months (29 percent) or years (22 percent), while only 18 percent said it would last days. About as many Israelis, 44 percent, think that an Israeli strike would actually strengthen Iran’s government as think it would weaken it (45 percent).

Two-thirds of Israelis, meanwhile, believe Hezbollah would most likely join Iran in retaliation against Israel — even if Israel did not strike Hezbollah forces. An additional 27 percent believe Hezbollah would join only if attacked.

So here is Netanyahu, putting all his effort and focus toward saber rattling, and his public isn't going along. Netanyahu would not likely carry out an attack that his public is against and Iran and the US know that electoral constraints would mean even the most belligerent rhetoric isn't likely to be backed up with action if it will cost a leader his office. The greatest obstacle to Israeli public support for a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran is the belief that the consequences of the attack from Iran, Hezbollah and other factions like Islamic Jihad, would be too high a cost to bear.

What could the Israeli government do to change this perception? Well, a successful large scale live action test of the US funded Iron Dome would probably help, and assassinating a PRC militant would provoke the projectiles to trigger one.

As the 'Iron Dome' (which can also refer to Israel's hard-headed policy toward Gaza) was put into use, Israeli right wing publications openly favoring belligerency toward Iran happily reported on the success of the system. Israeli publications that have been less hawkish on Iran took a different approach.

Haaretz's Aluf Benn picks up on on how Netanyahu is "preparing Israeli public opinion for war on Iran" yet somehow fails to even mention Gaza in his piece, let alone ask the obvious question about whether shaping Israeli public opinion toward war could explain the inexplicable Israeli decision making behind provoking projectile fire from Gaza.

27 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza and 80 more injured from Israeli fire after the assassination of Qaisi.

Are these mere sacrificial guinea pigs for Netanyahu's experiment?

Mourners in Gaza are not waiting for Haaretz to ask that question.

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Is Obama more Zionist Than Dubya Bush?

Remember last year when there was a great deal of commotion about President Barack Obama's reference to the 1967 lines being used as the basis of negotiated land swaps between Israel and Palestine?

It was hard to forget. Obama's political foes and even some of his friends accused him of throwing Israel under the bus. Netanyahu used the opportunity to slam Obama for this and stated that "Israel will not return to the indefensible boundaries of 1967". In fact, when he said this before Congress they gave him one of 29 standing ovations.

As Republican candidates vie for the party's nomination, they have not shied from using this issue to attack Obama as well, following Netanyahu's lead.

But, successive administrations have stated the same thing time and again about the US position which is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 242. Most reasonable observers knew at the time that Obama's statements where in no way a major shift in policy.

Or was it?

If it was, Jeffery Goldberg, for one, didn't notice. He wrote, in a post titled 'Did Obama Say Something so Different than Bush?' (emphasis mine):

In 2005, Geoge W. Bush stated that it is "unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949" (the 1967 boundaries of Israel, in other words). Today, Barack Obama said that he believes "the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states

Seems straightforward enough. The immediate predecessor to Obama, George W. Bush, talked about the 1949 Armistice line which Goldberg tells us equals the 1967 line. So essentially, Bush and Obama had the same position, right? Here is an excerpt from President Bush's speech in the Rose Garden in 2005 (emphasis mine):

Any final status agreement must be reached between the two parties, and changes to the 1949 Armistice lines must be mutually agreed to. A viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not work. There must also be meaningful linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States today, it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations.

If we go by Goldberg's translation, 1949 Armistice lines = 1967 lines. This formula is not just the Goldberg standard. Here is the New York Times on this issue (emphasis mine):

Those commitments came in a letter from President George W. Bush which stated, among other things that “it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949,” another way of describing the 1967 boundaries.

To be sure, NPR checked with Glenn Kessler, author of the Washington Post's "Fact Checker" column to, well, check the facts:

President BARACK OBAMA: We believe the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps.

CONAN: And Glenn, is that a substantial change from what presidents have said before?

Mr. KESSLER: Yes, it is. I mean, in the context of diplomacy, what President Obama said that was different was that he actually referenced 1967, the 1967 lines, the de-facto border that had basically existed since the end of the 1948 war of independence.

CONAN: So if he had said the armistice lines of 1948, would that have been different?

Mr. KESSLER: No, what I did is I researched and looked at what all previous presidents had said, and actually they never said anything about lines one way or the other.

I'm not sure what kind of research Glenn did to miss the statement by President Bush buried deep down in this dusty archive. But its not just the fact the Bush made reference to the 1949 armistice line that contrasts with Kessler's statements. He seems to be saying, like the New York Times, Jeffery Goldberg and even some Palestinians that the 1949 Armistice Line = the 1967 line.

Well, to be perfectly accurate, we are all wrong. The 1949 armistice line is not the same as the 1967 line. Here is why, check out the map of Gaza below (enlarge). The red line you see is the actual armistice line from 1949. The blue line is what we see on maps today which often is refered to as the Green Line or the 1967 line. So what happened to all the area, some 200km², in purple?

Essentially, the Israelis just took it. The blue line is actually the 1950 modus videndi line. This was an agreement between Egypt, which filled the vacuum of power in Gaza at the time, and the Israelis that established a temporary buffer zone (the purple area) on the Arab side of the actual armistice line. The agreement divides the territory up into areas A,B and C and resulted in a permanent Israeli land grab. (Why does this sound so familiar?) Dr. Salman Abu Sitta, an outstanding Palestinian historical geographer, made a great presentation about this, the Nakba, and other Israel land grabs here at the Palestine Center.

There are areas other than Gaza where the lines diverge. This ironically includes the villages in the triangle area in the north eastern part of the West Bank which Israel was not supposed to enter and today, for reasons of 'demographic threat' probably wishes it never had. I'd encourage you to watch the whole presentation.

President Obama actually visited this purple area grabbed by the Israelis in the map above. President George W. Bush, despite all the damage his policies did in the region, clearly chose to use the language of the 1949 armistice line over the 1967 lines for a reason. By doing this, Bush actually signified the correct dividing line on which negotiations should be based. By reversing from the Bush language of "1949 armistice lines" to 1967 borders, Obama actually supported a Zionist land grab.

I wonder what his right-wing detractors have to say about that?

In sum, this is just another example of how, over time Zionist expansionism has taken more and more of Palestine, constantly changing the starting point and re-leveraging their negotiating position. It also goes to show you that over time, the temporary becomes permanent and a lie told often enough becomes truth. (At least we have the internet to set things straight.)

Is it any wonder why the Palestinians want a complete stop to any such expansion before even thinking of negotiations?

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Amman Talks: No Deal Abbas' Fault? No, Diehl.

Jackson Diehl, the Jerusalem Washington Post editor who has often written one-sided columns squarely placing blame on the Palestinians or President Obama for the death of the Peace Process is at it again. In a piece today, Diehl posits that the Amman talks failed because......."the Palestinian leader punted". Original stuff from Diehl, I know. He's blamed Abbas and Obama several times, including here, here and here, in the past year and as you can see in the columns, he dosn't bother to quote any Palestinians.

This most recent piece is especially ridiculous. Diehl paints the picture that the Israelis presented a proposal to the Palestinians on borders. What he won't tell you is that the Palestinians presented a detailed written document, with maps, specifying their position on where the border should be, while the Israelis put nothing in writing and presented no maps whatsoever.

Diehl tries to hide the fact that the Israelis refused to reply with a written and detailed document like the one the Palestinians provided. He states in his piece that the Israelis "presented substantive proposals" and that Netanyahu's negotiator "set out" a proposal on borders in the final meeting. "Presented" and "set out" are Diehl's ways of dancing around the reality that the Israelis refused to put anything in writing.

What is even worse is that Diehl relies on a report from Haaretz' Barak Ravid which he clearly selectively reads. In Ravid's report, it becomes evident that the Israelis never submitted a written proposal or a map but rather presented "principles". (Maps, by the way, tend to be helpful when discussing things like borders.) Anyone familiar with the negotiations who read Ravid's article could hardly describe the principles laid out by Molho as anything other than vague and unhelpful.

The Annapolis talks which ended in 2008 suffered from a similar flaw when, at the highest levels, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at the time simply flashed a map before President Abbas without allowing him to keep it for analysis or discussion. We learn from the Palestine Papers that the discussion on borders fell apart over issues like the settlements of Ariel and Maale Adumim, two large settlements deep in Palestinian territory. When talking about land swaps of 1.9%, or 4% or 6.8% or 10.2% the specifics tend to matter.

So when the Palestinians presented a detailed document showing where they believed the line should be, they did so with the faith that their Israeli counterparts would respond with the same level of seriousness about the specifics. To understand just how vague and unhelpful the Israeli proposal was, let's go back to Ravid's report, the same one Diehl quotes (emphasis mine):

Molho presented several principles:

1. The border will be drawn in a way that will include the maximum amount of Israelis living in the West Bank, and the minimum amount of Palestinians.

2. Israel will annex the large settlement blocs, without defining what exactly is considered a ‘bloc,’ nor defining its size.

3. It is necessary to first solve the problem of borders and security in relation to Judea and Samaria, and only afterwards move to discuss the topic of Jerusalem which is far more complicated.

4. Israel will maintain a presence in the Jordan Valley for a period of time. Molho did not mention how long nor what kind of presence.

So, if you are the Palestinian side and you painstakingly drew a specific line through what is your own territory, to include in a written proposal to the Israelis about where the border should be, how would you interpret the proposal from the Israeli side as characterized by Ravid above? The Israelis want to keep most of the settlers in most of the blocs but wont say what a bloc is or how big it can be. They want to keep a presence in the Jordan valley but wont say for how long or what kind.

What kind of nonsense is this?

When the disagreements between the sides comes down to specific settlements and fractions of percents, precision is necessary for progress. What the Palestinians got in return for their good faith effort in presenting a precise map was vague principles that indicated the Israelis were not interested in moving forward or matching the seriousness of their counterparts.

Despite facing tremendous pressure from his own public NOT to return to what has amounted to worthless negotiations for decades, Mahmoud Abbas agreed to the Quartet call for a three-month timeline for negotiations on security and borders. The Israelis supposedly "agreed to put forward a comprehensive proposal on borders within three months." The Palestinians, for their part, actually submitted a "document relating to security arrangements and the prospective borders of a Palestinian State, in which they agreed to a 1.9% land swap of West Bank territory"

The Israelis submitted NOTHING in writing and then, on the final day of the end of the three months since the Quartet call, Netanyahu's representative provides nothing more than vague principles.

Any half-objective observer must conclude that the Israelis are simply wasting everyone's time.

Here is what Diehl concluded:

Yet Abbas passed up what could have been an opportunity to press Netanyahu for his bottom lines on the terms for statehood — and force a debate in Israel. Not for the first time, the Palestinian leader punted.

You'd think Diehl would at least chide the Israelis for waiting until the very last day to present these undetailed principles just as he chided the Palestinians for waiting until the 9th month of a 10 month 'settlement freeze' as he did in this column. Of course, if you thought that, it would be because you thought of him as some sort of consistent and objective observer and not a hack. And, of course, you'd be wrong.

Diehl has effectively acted as Netanyahu's finger in Washington - ready to point blame on the Palestinians and Obama in a effort to set the discourse in favor of an Israeli Prime Minister, who leads the most right-wing coalition in Israeli history and is dedicated to continued colonization of Palestinian territory.

Thankfully we have this thing called the internet and can expose all the additional fingers pointing right back at Jackson Diehl.

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