Wikileaked: The Gulf Between Dictators and Their People

Now that a few days have gone by since the initial release of some secret U.S. State Department cables by the website WikiLeaks, we can pause and reflect on some of the reaction to the revelations brought forth by the cables and ask what this all really means. A great deal has been made out of the cables relating to the Middle East and Iran and the views of some Arab leaders toward this issue. Earlier in the week I also made a list of some of the important cables relating to Palestine.

One of the immediate, and typical reactions to come from the Middle East, was conspiracy theory. This is sadly endemic in a region that has been betrayed by colonizers and occupiers throughout its history and has witnessed several coups only to later learn they were dreamed up in foreign capitals. Nevertheless, as revelations put the focus on Iran, some have begun to suggest that WikiLeaks is an Israeli conspiracy. There is no shortage of instances where Israel has had its hand in events in the Middle East, but to suggest that the WikiLeaks revelations are one of them seems like a stretch to me. On this note, those who look at the revealed cables and question the undue focus on Iran should keep three things in mind: First, it's Western media that has sensationalized its interpretation of the cables in a way that supposedly facilitates confrontation with Iran (I'll explain why I say supposedly below). Second, the fact there there is no love lost between some Arab rulers and Iran is nothing new and not much of a revelation at all; it's merely a confirmation of what was assumed by many and said behind closed doors. Third, a fraction of the cables have been released so far. According to the Cablegate website, nearly 8,000 cables originated from the Embassy in Ankara, 6,000 from Baghdad, 4,000 from Amman, and anywhere from 2-4,000 cables originated from Embassies and Consulates in Kuwait, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo and so on. There is probably A LOT more to be learned about wheeling and dealing in the Middle East and U.S.-Israel relations from what is yet to come.

The real story behind the fact that the cables showcased previously non-public feelings of Arab rulers toward Iran is not that they actually feel this way but rather, that they make every effort not to express these sentiments publicly. Anyone with a sense of the region's geopolitics and history would probably have been able to predict the feelings of each of these Arab rulers and the extent of their angst with Tehran. It comes as no surprise that Qatar's ruler, who had the most restrained concern about Iran, shares a natural gas field with their Persian neighbors. Likewise, it was entirely predictable that the most bellicose sentiments would come from leaders in the U.A.E, who have a territorial dispute with Iran, and Sunni-ruled Bahrain that represses its largely Shia, Iranian sympathetic, polity. The big question (and really the most obvious one) which most mainstream media outlets in the West have failed to pose is why the secrecy? Why hide your feelings about Iran? Why not just come out and say it?

The reason they won't take these stances publicly is the real story here. Just look at some of the emphasis put on keeping these sentiments secret. Here is a cable describing how Oman is irked by U.S. reporting of weapons sales to Oman, and how "any belief that the U.S. would attempt to utilize Omani territory in this way could potentially cause a public backlash that would jeopardize other aspects of our relationship. The deployment of Patriots to Oman, especially with the goal of countering the Iran threat, would run completely counter to Oman's publicly-stated foreign-policy objectives."

Another cable describes the not so unique position of another Arab official in the U.A.E: "MbZ's pre-occupation with Iran (and his secondary concern about Islamic fundamentalism) lead him to have a strategic view of the region that is curiously close to the Israeli one. But domestic politics flow the other way, and he feels constrained in what he can say publicly." He also believes that "if there were an election in Dubai tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over."

Or this cable where Egyptian President Mubarak talks about how "he opined that no Arab state will join the U.S. in a defense relationship vis-a-vis Iran out of fear of 'sabotage and Iranian terrorism.'" He said Iran's sponsorship of terrorism is "well-known but I cannot say it publicly. It would create a dangerous situation." Mubarak said that sanctions are the best hope for containing Iran, but Arab states won't dare to endorse them."

So why not? The reality is the Arab publics do not view Iran the same way their unelected leaders do. In fact, most Arabs support Iran's right to a nuclear program. Polling shows that support for Iranian nuclear ambitions in the Arab world is high and that Arabs see Israel and the U.S. as the most significant threats they face, with Iran being an insignificant concern. One should keep in mind that this polling, while likely the most representative and comprehensive we have available, is heavily skewed toward largely Sunni publics in what are described as moderate Arab states. Surely, the inclusion of countries like Iraq and Bahrain, which have large Shia populations, or countries like Syria, which have a pro-Iran slant and, to a lesser extent, Qatar, would probably show even more Arab public support for Iran's nuclear ambitions, and even greater distaste for Israel and the U.S.

But, you may be asking, if these Arab states are in fact autocracies, why does public opinion there matter? Well there are two immediate answers to this, one more obvious than the other: The first, and the more obvious one, is that angering Arab publics isn't going to win over any hearts or minds, and, as General Patreaus noted earlier this year, will complicate U.S. missions in the region. Still, suppose the Arab States, like the neo-cons who support confrontation with Iran, don't mind a exponential spike in transnational terror recruitment. Why else would opposing public opinion on this important foreign policy issue, which would lead to what one Arab official called a "catastrophic impact on the region," be a bad idea?

Because the public reaction may very well significantly raise the costs of regime survival to the Arab states. Iran has sympathetic constituencies in most Arab states in the region which led another Arab official to state that the "Shi'a crescent has become a full moon." The cost of putting down domestic uprisings is not cheap, and Iran knows this and can exploit this significantly as it continues with its nuclear program. Around the Arab world, Iranian support for sympathetic constituencies acts as a deterrent that would raise the costs of action against the Iranian regime for many Arab states.

So all this puts the neo-cons in a very peculiar position. Many of the Iran hawks, who had previously supported the invasion of Iraq, defend the policy of regime change by claiming the installation of democracy was worth it all. Now they point to unelected Arab rulers, who'd be acting against popular will, as support for attacking Iran.

This makes them very much like one of the Arab rulers, Hosni Mubarak (the third longest ruling leader in Egypt's 5,000 year history, who's party just won 95% of seats in parliament) who had this advice for the U.S. in Iraq: "Forget democracy" he said "strengthen the armed forces, relax your hold, and then you will have a coup. Then we will have a dictator, but a fair one."

Oh, well, I guess when you put it that way, it is easier to understand why conspiracy theories are so prevalent in this region.

I guess what the Iran war hawks and Arab rulers have in common is that they are both willing to look the other way when dictators trample democracy, so long as it suits their interests.

That said, the real revelation produced by these cables is the gulf between the attitudes of Arab publics and those who rule them. As mentioned above, some have interpreted these revelations to mean that there are fewer obstacles in the path to U.S. or Israeli confrontation with Iran. It seems to be quite the contrary. These revelations have effectively exposed embarrassing positions held by some Arab leaders vis-a-vis Iran, and have already led some to back-off on the rhetoric divulged in the cables. Unsurprisingly, Arab state-directed media outlets have yet to strongly question the leadership of their respective countries about the stances revealed in the cables. Meanwhile, others have been forced to back-off. Bahrain, whose King had "argued forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear program, by whatever means necessary," provided this awkward retreat here:

"The illegally-leaked and published US documents by the WikiLeaks website reflect US officials' own analysis and understanding of the conclusions of their joint meetings with the leaders and officials in the region as well as from other relevant events," Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, the foreign minister, said.

"Jumping to one-sided conclusions based on such understandings will undoubtedly lead to false, incorrect and inaccurate results that would not serve security and stability in the region," he said in a statement on Tuesday evening.

According to the minister, Bahrain has also called for adherence of all countries in the region, to relevant working international laws and conventions.

"The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Bahrain on regional issues has clearly been declared and confirmed in all of our joint meetings with international officials, as well as in our public statements, official meetings or press conferences," the foreign minister said.

Bahrain has always stressed the right of all countries to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as well as the need for Middle East to be free from all weapons of mass destruction, the foreign minister said.

So if anything, the revelations in the cables will likely make any concerted effort against Iran that includes Arab states all the more difficult since the publics will undoubtedly be more skeptical about their leaders' stances on this issue, and the leaders all the more averse to being implicated in action against Iran.

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